Main Article Content
Jan 2, 2020
Abstract
This paper, by dummy variables that capture the behavior of the fiscal expenditure before and after of the electoral process, look for evidence to determine if the political authorities of Chile have used the national budget in order to influence the result of the elections, behavior known as oportunistic political cycle. The result show his presence in the fiscal expenditure, however, this behavior was presented in those periods with a high electoral competition by the political coalitions.
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